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one cannot know everything about God. When religious experts—at least 
the ones with which I am familiar, such as Alston, Bradshaw, Engelhardt, 
Plantinga, Swinburne, etc.—say that God is incomprehensible, they are 
using the term in something like the latter sense. Contrary to what Den-
nett suggests, they seem perfectly capable of demonstrating, at least to 
other experts, that “they know what they are talking about.”
Nonetheless, my suspicion is that Dennett correctly suggests that many, 
perhaps the overwhelming majority, of the religious do not understand in 
a technical, philosophical sense the doctrines they profess and, hence, that 
they do not believe them in a technical, philosophical sense. Whether they 
‘believe,’ or have ‘faith,’ in some other sense is an interesting question and 
one that has received a fair amount of attention both from philosophers 
and from theologians—see, e.g., Alston, Muyskens, Pojman, Plantinga, 
Pruss, etc.; cf. Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Luther. Unfortunately, 
however, Dennett addresses only a very limited sample of the literature 
on this topic. Thus, his discussion of belief in God, though interesting and 
important, is rather misleading and underdeveloped.
In the third part (chapters 9–11), Dennett turns his attention to questions 
about the professed benefits of religion and about the practical implica-
tions of his hypothesis. There is much that is of interest in this section, but 
(in the interest of brevity) let me highlight just two particularly important 
claims. One is that if religions are going to claim to have physical or moral 
benefits, they should subject their claims to scientific scrutiny. The other is 
that the religious must stand up, forcefully and effectively, to the extremists 
in their midst who foster ignorance or evil in the name of their religion. 
In summary, Dennett’s fans will likely be disappointed to the extent 
with which Dennett sacrifices rigor for accessibility, and the readers he 
desires most to reach will likely find his writing style objectionable, in part 
because he likes to “tease” (p. 412n18) and in part because he is both less 
than fully accurate in representing and less than fully charitable in deal-
ing with the positions with which he disagrees (see, e.g., pp. 227–228, 268, 
365). Nonetheless, everyone should share his stated goal: to discover the 
truth about the world’s religions (see, e.g., p. 311f., 319). Thus, whatever its 
shortcomings in substance and in style, Breaking the Spell is worth reading 
for those who are interested in a provocative and accessible survey of “the 
best current version” of the naturalistic study of religion.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment, by Alexander r. Pruss. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xiii and 335. $88.00 (Cloth).
DAVID werTHer, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Leibniz tells us that the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), along with 
the law of non-contradiction, is one of the two principles upon which we 
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base all of our reasoning. Those who are accustomed to reflecting on PSR 
within the confines of the cosmological argument might wonder about as-
signing such a significant role to PSR. In The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A 
Reassessment, Alexander R. Pruss parts company with Leibniz over the ne-
cessitating nature of PSR, but offers a wide-ranging discussion worthy of 
the seventeenth-century polymath. Among other things, Pruss relates PSR 
to modal fatalism, libertarian freedom, quantum mechanics, counterfactu-
als, self-evidence, inference to the best explanation, and alethic modality. 
I found his critique of ungrounded causal chains, reconciliation of PSR 
with indeterminacy, and linking of PSR with Aristotelian alethic modality 
especially intriguing.
Pruss’s preferred version of PSR is Necessarily, every contingent truth has an 
explanation. Necessity here is broadly logical or metaphysical necessity, and 
the scope of explanation is—with respect to contingency—global. To grasp 
the sorts of states of affairs Pruss takes PSR to range over, it is helpful to con-
sider his critique of the Humean claim that explanation is agglomerative.
In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Part IX, David Hume 
writes
Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twen-
ty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you after-
wards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. (cited by Pruss, p. 41)
Pruss argues that, even if we suppose that each of the particles causes an-
other, this causal account cannot be explanatorily adequate. Appealing to 
the first particle to explain the second, the second the third . . . and finally 
the twentieth to explain the first, takes us right back to where we started, 
leaving us with a vicious circularity.
Pruss goes on to show that there is a looping problem even with infi-
nitely long causal chains, so long as they are “groundless,” that is, lacking 
both a first member causing all the other members and an external cause 
for the entire chain. To illustrate this (see p. 43 for the formal argument), 
Pruss asks us to imagine an infinite sequence of chickens and eggs, with 
each chicken owing its existence to the preceding egg and each egg owing 
its existence to the preceding chicken.
[I]f we accept infinitely regressive explanations, then we should be willing 
to say that the existence and activity of the members of the set of eggs are 
explained by the existence and activity of the members of the set of chickens 
while the existence and activity of the chickens are explained by that of the 
eggs. This is circular and clearly fails to answer the question why there are 
any chickens and eggs at all. (p. 44)
 If, in keeping with PSR, all contingent truths have genuine explanations 
and there cannot be any ungrounded causal chains, then there must be a 
regress-stopping, necessarily existing first cause. So, PSR’s global range of 
explanation points pretty clearly in the direction of theism.
 Pruss compares the global PSR with “local” causal principles such 
as every contingent being that comes into existence has a cause and every 
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contingent event has a cause (p. 66). These more restricted principles do 
permit ungrounded causal chains. Pruss, however, argues that the intu-
ition behind these principles moves us past them to the global PSR.
Most of us, when surveying the wreckage of a plane, would not accept 
The plane crashed for no reason as the right account of the catastrophe. Rath-
er, our intuition would be that there must be some explanation for this 
event. And, this intuition might lead us to accept a local causal principle 
like every contingent event has a cause.
With this sort of principle, the correct explanation for the crash might 
be found in
[A] certain event e1 half a minute before the crash. The event e1 is caused by 
some further event e2 two-thirds of a minute before the crash. e2 is caused 
by an event e3 three-quarters of a minute before the crash. And so on: en-1 
is caused by an event en that happened 1-1/(n +1) minutes before the crash. 
But there is, in fact, no cause one minute before the crash or earlier re-
sponsible for the crash. Rather, right after one minute before the crash an 
infinite chain of events eventuated for no reason at all that led to the plane’s 
crashing. (p. 47)
But this will not do because the same intuition that led us to reject “for 
no reason” as the truth about the plane crash, would also lead us to reject 
“for no reason” as the truth about this causal chain. If, in general, we can-
not satisfy our initial explanatory intuition with stories about groundless 
causal chains, then we cannot settle for any principle weaker than PSR, 
that, taken alone, permits counterintuitive ungrounded causal chains.
Pruss pays close attention to a dilemma—developed by Peter van In-
wagen and others—that seems to arise from PSR’s global nature. Call the 
collection of all contingent true propositions, the big conjunctive contin-
gent fact, BCCF. PSR requires that there be an explanation for this fact. 
However, a contingent truth cannot explain BCCF for contingent truths 
are not self-explaining. Nor can its explanation be a necessary truth for, 
whatever is entailed by a necessary truth is necessarily true. So, to hold 
that a necessary truth entails BCCF is to take away its contingency and so 
deny that there is a BCCF. Thus, the advocate of PSR appears to have only 
two unpalatable alternatives: affirm a self-explaining contingent truth or 
allow that a necessary truth is the explanans for BCCF.
Pruss denies that the dilemma is foolproof and argues that the propo-
nent of PSR can grab either horn without being impaled. Holding that a 
necessary truth explains BCCF is problematic only if one supposes that 
in order for a necessary truth to serve as the explanans for a contingent 
truth, there must be an entailment relation between them. But, explana-
tion need not require entailment. We count scientific explanations with 
ceteris paribus clauses to be genuine explanations, even though there is 
no entailment between explanans and explanandum. If we count as nec-
essary truths, God exists, and God considers all of the reasons in favor of each 
possible creation, then these claims can serve as the explanans for the BCCF, 
even though they do not entail that fact. If we assume that God has liber-
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tarian freedom, then the contingent truth, God freely chooses to instantiate 
BCCF for reason R, can serve as an explanans for BCCF.
Both of these proposed explanations are controversial. Some might ar-
gue that neither non-entailing necessary truths nor an exercise of libertar-
ian freedom could serve as adequate explanans for BCCF. The former fail 
in that they do not provide a sufficient condition for the explanandum, 
while the latter is inadequate because libertarian freedom is too mysteri-
ous to be enlightening.
Pruss disagrees. A sufficient explanation need not provide a sufficient 
condition, a necessitating reason, for, as already noted, an entailment rela-
tion between explanans and explanandum is not a necessary condition for 
a genuine explanation. With regard to the appeal to libertarian freedom, 
Pruss argues that this explanans tells us all there is to tell, and thereby is a 
paradigm case of a sufficient explanation. If one wishes to dispute the ap-
propriateness of designating such explanations as offering sufficient rea-
son, Pruss is willing to make a present of “sufficient reason” to his critics 
and dub his view the Principle of Good Explanation (p. 103).
Talk of contingency ultimately leads to the topic of modality, the last 
subject Pruss discusses. If it is true that things might not have been as they 
are, say George W. Bush could have been a used car salesman, why is that? 
Given David Lewis’s “extreme modal realism,” the answer is that there 
is a spatio-temporal realm, closed off from ours, in which an individual 
very much like George W. Bush (one of his counterparts) sells pre-owned 
vehicles. On an “actualist” approach to modality, the answer is to be found 
in relations among abstracta; there is a maximally consistent set of propo-
sitions that includes George w. Bush runs a sale on gas guzzling SUvs.
Pruss finds both views problematic as it is unclear how we could have 
epistemic access either to the Platonic heavens or to a spatio-temporal realm 
cut off from ours. If, however, one understands modality from an Aristote-
lian perspective on which possibility is grounded in the dispositions, capa-
bilities and powers of actually existing entities, then our knowledge can be 
based upon direct experience. On the basis of this epistemic consideration, 
as well as ethical and metaphysical issues we cannot delve into here, Pruss 
favors the Aristotelian perspective. Here the truth of George w. Bush might 
have been a used car salesman is grounded in Bush’s actual abilities.
After outlining this Aristotelian account of modality, Pruss identifies a 
major concern: “it is difficult to see how one could get worlds out of it” (p. 
318). One way around this difficulty is to draw on the resources of Leibni-
zian theism and take a possible world to be: “a maximal idea, a thinking, 
in the mind of God about a world God could initiate the production of, 
with God being . . . the substance whose causal powers ground all other 
possibilities” (p. 320).
 Pruss argues that, if we take Aristotelian modality, perhaps combined 
with Leibnizian theism, to be preferable to alternative modal views, we 
are thereby committed to PSR. To see this, suppose that the Aristotelian 
view is correct and a claim P is contingently true. And, for reductio, as-
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kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected essays, by C. Stephen evans. 
Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006. Pp. 352. $49.95 (hardback).
kierkegaard’s ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral obligations, by C. 
Stephen Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004/2006 (paper). Pp. 
376. $195.00 (hardback), $45.00 (paper).
MYRON BRADLEY PENNER, Prairie College
These two books represent the culmination of decades of reading Kierke 
gaard’s texts and philosophical reflection on them.1 They offer both a de-
fense of the relevance of Kierkegaard to philosophy today and a polemic 
against various (mis)readings of Kierkegaard. Evans is one of few analytic 
philosophers who sees value in Kierkegaard’s thought and who has pa-
tiently and carefully spent time in the Kierkegaardian texts. As a result, 
he has produced a substantial body of work over some thirty years that 
brings Kierkegaard’s thought to bear not only on issues in philosophy 
of religion, but the wider questions of contemporary analytic philosophy 
as well. Both these books warrant close reading by anyone interested in 
1For simplicity, both Evans and I use the term “Kierkegaard” to refer to the body of 
thought presented in the texts historically written by Søren Kierkegaard, whether pseud-
onymous or not. This is not to overlook the immense importance of pseudonymity but to 
simplify reference.
sume that the PSR-denying claim, ~E: There is no explanation for the truth of 
P and so no causal explanation for P, is also contingently true. (Note: Pruss 
employs only the second conjunct in what I have called ~E; however, he 
derives it from the first.) Let W1 be a possible world in which the conjunc-
tion, P and ~e, is true. Since this conjunction is, if true, contingently true, 
there is a possible world, w2, in which it false. The Brouwer axiom tells us 
that if a claim is true, then necessarily it is possibly true. So, from the Brou-
wer axiom it follows that in W2, though P and ~e is false, it is nonetheless 
possibly true. Given Aristotelian modal views, if P and ~e is possibly true 
in w2 then some thing or things in W2 must have causal powers capable 
of bringing about the truth of P and ~e. But, it is impossible for anything 
to cause it to be the case that an uncaused state of affairs obtains. So, the 
affirmation of the PSR-denying ~e, together with an Aristotelian account 
of modality results in an absurdity. It follows that it is not possible that the 
Aristotelian modal view be true and PSR false.
Nor is it possible in a brief review to describe adequately the richness of 
Pruss’s work. It exemplifies analytical rigor and invites continued reflection. 
Anyone interested in PSr owes Alexander r. Pruss a debt of gratitude.1 
1Thanks to Douglas Groothuis and Mark Linville for very helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of the review.
